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Cotton Sector Policies and Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons Behind the 
Numbers in Mozambique and Zambia 
 
Abstract 
  Cotton is one of the most important smallholder cash crops in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  
How to ensure input supply, credit recovery and competition is a subject of intense policy 
debate.  This paper examines the performance of cotton sector development policies in 
Mozambique and Zambia.  Both countries face the challenge of organizing input supply to 
farmers in the absence of rural credit markets, and competing in international markets distorted 
by production subsidies in developed countries.  Both countries privatized cotton ginning in the 
1990s.  Emerging from civil war, Mozambique established geographical monopolies to interlink 
input and output markets and facilitate credit recovery.  In Zambia, the government completely 
liberalized the cotton sector, forcing the private sector to deal with the problem of input 
distribution and credit recovery by itself.  Despite being landlocked, Zambia’s cotton sector has 
achieved better performance in terms of both value of cotton output per hectare and smallholder 
share of world market prices.  An analysis of the institutional and technical factors behind the 
two countries’ performance provides insights to guide the design of public/private partnerships 
relevant to many SSA countries.   
Keywords: Cotton, Mozambique, Zambia, liberalization, agricultural policy 
 
Introduction 
  Cotton is one of Sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA) rare success stories over the past 20 years.  
While the continent’s share of world agricultural trade fell by half from 1980 to 2000, its share of 
world cotton trade rose by 30% (FAO, 2002).  Cotton production grew three times more rapidly 
in SSA over the period than it did in the rest of the world (Goreux and Macrae, 2002). Moreover, 
cotton is a predominantly smallholder crop in SSA, with over two million poor rural households 




  Because of the need for purchased inputs to achieve economic on-farm yields, and high 
quality requirements throughout the supply chain to be competitive in world markets, processed 
commodities such as cotton require a great deal of coordination to be produced, processed, and 
marketed competitively.  Since most farmers in SSA require credit to access the needed inputs, 
one of the key coordination challenges is to ensure timely access to and use of appropriate 
inputs, and subsequently to recover the credit.  Due to widespread credit market failure in SSA, 
most approaches to the input credit problem have featured interlocked transactions, often 
enforced by some degree of statutory monopoly, in which inputs are provided directly to farmers 
on credit and the credit is recovered upon purchase of the product (Dorward et al., 1998). 
  The weakness of contract enforcement mechanisms in most SSA countries has fueled 
concerns that the economic reforms sweeping the continent since the early 1990s may undermine 
credit recovery, leading to the collapse of cotton input systems and thus to the end of this 
remarkable success story.  Depressed world market prices for cotton lint, caused in part by 
massive subsidies provided to cotton farmers in developed economies, exacerbate these 
concerns.
1  With a decade of experience of cotton sector reform in SSA, it is now possible to 
review the empirical record and begin drawing lessons for future policy.  In this paper, we 
examine the experience of Mozambique and Zambia , whose contrasting policy approaches and 
performance appear to challenge concerns that liberalization inevitably leads to the collapse of 
input systems for crops like cotton.  We first place these countries in context by providing a brief 
empirical overview of the performance of cotton sectors in seven SSA countries of Southern, 
Eastern, and West Africa.  We then focus on Mozambique and Zambia, reviewing their differing 
initial conditions at the outset of reform, the divergent policies that each has put in place, and 
their relative performance.  We conclude that a simple policy choice between liberalization or 
regulated monopoly is not sufficient for either cotton sector to achieve desired performance in 
the absence of rural input and credit markets, and identify the elements of joint public/private 





Cotton Sector Performance in Seven SSA Countries 
  Two key performance dimensions for any agricultural commodity chain are 1) the levels 
of productivity and quality achieved throughout the chain, and 2) the extent to which it pays 
farmers a competitive share of the chain’s total value-added.   We focus on these two dimensions 
to develop a simple graphical assessment of the performance of seven SSA countries over the 
harvest years 1995 through 2002.  studies.  The first performance dimension is generally 
associated with coordination of activities throughout the chain, while the latter typically depends 
on competition among firms for seed cotton purchase. Thus, this assessment may also shed light 
on the extent to which countries are balancing the frequently conflicting needs for both 
competition and coordination.  
  In Figure 1, the horizontal axis measures mean gross export value per hectare, and is the 
multiplicative result of indicators of farm-level productivity (seed cotton yield), productivity in 
processing (ginning outturn ratio), and lint quality (premium or discount relative to the Cotlook 
Index A benchmark price).  The export value achieved depends on the effectiveness of short-
term coordination within production and marketing seasons, and also the success of the country 
over time in supporting research, extension, varietal zoning agreements, and other dimensions 
that provide the base for productivity and quality.  To simplify the presentation, we use the 
average export value per hectare for each country over the eight years in our analysis.  Our 
vertical axis is the producer price share of the sales price realized by ginning companies when 
they export cotton lint.  Both the mean and range in producer price share are plotted for each 
country.
2 
  Figure 1 is broken into quadrants using median annual values of export value per ha 
(US$134/ha) and producer price share (0.473) for all seven countries over the 1995-2002 period.  
Countries in the south-west quadrant are the worst performers in each dimension, while those in 





-  Mali, Benin and Zimbabwe achieved higher average export values per hectare than the 
seven-country median.  This performance reflects effective vertical coordination, strong 
research and extension systems, and significant subsidies that have helped to maintain 
production levels during world market price downturns;
3 
-  Zambia paid the highest average producer price share of any country over the period 
(0.566) while achieving an average export value close to the median.  Tanzania achieved 
a slightly better average export value than Zambia, but with a markedly lower average 
producer price share; 
-  Mozambique paid the lowest average producer share of any country over the period, 
despite the advantage of coastal access, and achieved the second lowest average export 
value per hectare. 
In the next section we focus on Zambia and Mozambique and take a closer look behind the 
numbers to better understand their contrasting performance.   
 
A tale of two cotton sectors 
  Mozambique: from post-war recovery to regulated stagnation 
  Cotton production was introduced to Mozambique by the colonial government in the 
early part of the last century and grew to an annual average of 120,000 tons of raw cotton at 
independence in 1975.  Immediately after independence production fell by two thirds, and 
continued to fall as a result of armed civil conflict to 10,000 tons in 1985 (Ofiço and Tschirley, 
2002).   Clearly, Mozambique initiated reform under very unfavorable circumstances. 
  The top of Table 1 lists the chronology and path of cotton sector reform in Mozambique.  
Following the end of the civil war, the government and private sector formed joint-venture 
companies (JVCs) to rehabilitate the cotton sector.  In the absence of rural credit markets, JVCs 
were responsible for providing inputs and technical assistance to all smallholders wishing to 
grow cotton in their exclusive areas of geographical influence (termed “concessions”), and 




maintenance and security.  With the exception of minimum prices, determined each year through 
negotiations between the companies and government, JVCs were largely free of government 
involvement in their operations.  The Mozambique Cotton Institute, part of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development, is responsible for oversight of the sector and is funded in 
part by an export tax. 
  Although area cultivated and production increased very rapidly in the post-war period, 
almost reaching pre-independence levels in 1999, the impressive post-war recovery masks low 
and stagnant productivity and serious difficulties in implementation of the regulatory framework 
(see Table 1).   New entrants have periodically challenged the geographical monopsonies of the 
JVCs and other licensed companies, resulting in intense price competition, serious credit 
recovery problems, and incidents of civil unrest.  Attempts to partially liberalize the sector 
during the 2000/2001 season, by allowing farmer associations and/or communities to contract 
with the cotton company of their choice, were not successful in eliminating “pirate buying”.  
Lobbying by ginners resulted in a return to clearly demarcated geographic concessions for all 
ginners.  Farmer associations were also denied their earlier right to negotiate with other 
companies, and the limited number of small competing firms are kept in line by the need for 
authorization from the concession company to market their raw cotton to third parties. 
  The focus of ginners and policymakers on conflict resolution and minimum prices has 
detracted from technology development and the emergence of alternative sources of input 
supply.  National average farm-level yields have stagnated at between 300-400 kg/ha, and a 
survey of  900 cotton farmers in Nampula found deficiencies in seed quality and technical 
assistance (Pitoro et al., 2001).  No seed treatment is offered despite its proven effectiveness in 
neighboring countries.  Though the Agence Française de Developpement has been supporting 
two companies in varietal development and strengthening of farmer associations, no new 





  Zambia’s emerging success story 
  The bottom of Table 1 presents a chronology of key events in Zambia’s cotton sector 
reform.  Zambia’s cotton sector was liberalized in late 1994 when the state monopoly (Lintco) 
was sold to two private companies.  Cotton production had been trending downwards under 
Lintco and the company had accumulated debts, but the sector remained functional.  Following 
liberalization, production rose from 20,000 mt to surpass 100,000 mt in the 1998 harvest year, 
and has averaged about 80,000 mt per annum since, nearly all by smallholders.  During 1998-
2000, exports of cotton and textiles were first among all agricultural exports in value (Export 
Board of Zambia, 2001).  Zambia is unique among the countries analyzed in the almost complete 
absence of government in production, marketing, regulation, or direct financial contribution to 
the sector (Govereh et al., 2002, Zulu and Tschirley, 2002).
4   
  The performance of Zambia’s cotton sector compares favorably with its neighbors in 
Southern and Eastern Africa (SEA).  Mean export values per hectare were well above those in 
Uganda and Mozambique, higher than Tanzania by the end of the period, and producer price 
shares exceeded those in all SEA countries.  This success has been achieved despite historically 
low cotton prices in the world market over the past four years, serious problems of credit default 
during the late 1990s, and the departure in 1999 of the sector’s biggest company, Lonhro. 
  The level of concentration among ginners in Zambia appears to be an important factor 
underlying the sector’s relatively good performance under liberalization.  Following the exit of 
Lonhro, two large companies (Dunavant and Clark Cotton) have between them maintained an 80 
- 90% market share.  Competition from smaller companies, from each other in one key 
producing area, and the lack of any government role regulating that competition, combine to 
encourage innovation in credit recovery systems, while the size and resources of the two large 
companies make it possible for them to innovate.  Other countries with liberalized cotton sectors, 
such as Uganda and Tanzania, have been unable to sustain private sector input distribution on 
credit because of the intense rivalry in seed cotton purchase between many competing buyers, 




good credit recovery in a liberalized environment, had until recently only three ginners, and one 
of these had a 70% market share (Tschirley and Zulu, 2002).  
  The Dunavant Distributor System is good example of private institutional innovation 
under liberalization.  The company has no extension agents; instead, independent “Distributors” 
contract with the company to receive inputs on credit and deliver them along with extension 
assistance to farmers.  Distributor’s earnings are a function of credit recovery; to maximize their 
earnings, Distributors must balance the number of farmers against the probability of repayment. 
Under the system, credit repayment rates for Dunavant rose from about 60% to 85% by 2001.  
Yields rose from 450 kg/ha to 600 kg/ha.( See Zulu and Tschirley, 2002 for more detail). 
  The gap in export value per hectare between Zambia and Zimbabwe suggests that there is 
significant room for improvement in the former.  Until recently, Zimbabwe had a number of 
advantages in terms of functioning credit and input markets, a legal system that enabled the 
recovery of assets from credit defaulters, and a strong public research system.  Improved varietal 
development, dissemination, and maintenance could significantly improve Zambia’s 
competitiveness, but will require effective coordination within the sector backed by substantial 
financial resources over long periods of time.  In the current international market environment, 
adequate funding will be difficult to ensure through levies on the private sector. 
 
Implications for improved competitiveness of SSA cotton sectors 
  Cotton is critical for improving rural household incomes and facilitating the emergence of 
a viable commercial smallholder agriculture in SSA.  Demand from spinners within SSA is 
likely to expand due to the opening of developed country markets for cloth and garments made in 
Africa.   But in an environment in which SSA competitiveness is undermined by subsidies to 
developed country cotton farmers, a proactive approach to private/public partnerships is 
necessary to maintain and improve the profitability of cotton for producers and ginners alike. A 
mix of public and private goods and services will be needed to resolve endemic rural credit 




to meet the strict quality requirements of modern spinning and weaving technology.  How to 
proceed? 
  First, in the presence of rural credit and input market failure and weak contract 
enforcement, liberalization appears to be most effective when the ginning sector is relatively 
concentrated.  Yet this concentration can have negative implications for rural poverty reduction 
if it depresses prices to farmers (Tschirley et al. 2002, Badiane et al 2002).  This suggests that 
governments have an important role to play in monitoring sector performance. 
  Second, governments and donors should exploit the capacity of private sector companies 
to deliver public services without expecting them to do so free of charge or diverting them from 
commercial principles.  In Mozambique, the Cotton Institute in collaboration with the European 
Union, has recently launched a competitive grant program to enable cotton companies to 
facilitate diversification of smallholder crop production and marketing (MADER, 2001).  The 
program is motivated by the fact that the extension and input distribution networks of the 
companies provide a delivery channel for non-cotton crop production technologies at lower cost 
than establishing new channels.  The companies are encouraged to partner with NGOs and other 
organizations with capacity in farmer association development and marketing, and crop 
production technology development and transfer.  
  Third, while projects aimed at diversification will bring benefits to smallholders in cotton 
growing areas, they cannot substitute for technical and institutional innovation in the cotton 
sector itself.   Innovation requires both funding and private incentives.  Funding is urgently 
needed in Mozambique and Zambia in three areas: 1) investment in development and 
multiplication of new varieties, 2) improved pest management, and 3) updated raw cotton 
grading systems.  In Mozambique, incentives for private innovation may have been reduced 
when the country returned to a rigid concession system with no rights by farmer associations to 
deal with any but the existing concession holder.   
  Fourth, to achieve effective mixes of public and private provision it is important to 




technological renewal.  Mozambique’s experience shows that a high level of policy-induced 
coordination is a necessary but not sufficient condition for innovation where participation is 
imbalanced and dialog is not transparent.  Two new institutional innovations that might help are 
1) incentive-driven performance contracts between government and the cotton companies with 
transparent reporting of results, and 2) the transfer of government’s shares in JVCs to farmers, 
with support from a cotton trust to act on behalf of the new farmer shareholders.  
  Finally, both countries need seriously to assess the potential impact of Bt cotton on 
profitability for smallholders and cotton companies.  Work on this issue in Zambia in 1999 was 
abandoned due to the lack of a biosafety regulatory framework; an effort by top public and 
private agricultural sector leaders in Mozambique to begin testing in 2002 failed to make 
progress for the same reason.  A key step forward in each case would be to recognize that 
biotechnology in a non-food cash crop like cotton raises fewer controversial issues than it does in 
maize, and to move forward with a “fast-track” framework that would allow the testing of Bt 
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Figure 1.  Plot of mean cotton export value/ha against mean producer price share for seven countries of SSA, 





















































Table 1.  Summary chronology of cotton sector reform in Mozambique and Zambia 
Year  Event/Action Taken  Comments 
 
------------------------------------------------    Mozambique   ------------------------------------------------  
 
1975-89  Independence, nationalization, civil war  Cotton production collapses from average of 138,000 mt 
seed cotton 1972-1974 to under 20,000 mt 1986-1988. 
1989  Three Joint Venture Companies awarded 
“concessions” in north of country 
Seed cotton production is relaunched after falling to a low of 
15,000 mt/year over past four years 
1989-95  JVC model with closed concessions 
remains dominant approach in the sector 
Seed cotton production rises to over 50,000 mt in 1995, due 
primarily to area expansion.  Sporadic problems of credit 
default. 
1996-99  Three private companies awarded 
concesssions 
Seed cotton production surpasses 100,000 mt in 1999 on 
large increases in number of smallholder producers and area.  
Yields remain stagnant around 300-400 kg/ha.  New entrants 
without concessions create major credit default problem. 
1998  Producer associations with >= 20 ha 
cotton allowed to contract with cotton 
company of their choice 
Measure taken in response to, helped fuel, rapid growth in 
farmer associations. Many contracted with cotton companies 
for more favorable terms.  New entrants formed large 
fictitious associations to purchase within concession areas. 
2000 Government  announces  “open concession 
system” 
Credit default problems continue.  Major outcry from 
concession holders threatening to leave the sector. 
2001  Government returns to closed concession 
system, awards concession to largest new 
entrant, eliminates right of associations to 
freely contract for input provision. 
Farmer associations report that concession companies 
discontinue pricing premia.  Indications of continued credit 
default, unrest among farmers. 
 
------------------------------------------------    Zambia   ------------------------------------------------  
 
1977-94  State-owned LINTCO runs single channel 
cotton system 
Production trends downward from mid-1980s but does not 
collapse.  Public debt accumulates. 
1994  Lintco sold to private companies Lonrho 
and Clark Cotton 
Companies operate for two years in separate areas of 
country.  Production booms, aided by high int’l prices. 
1997-99  Four new ginning companies enter market, 
independent traders also emerge.  
Government does not intervene 
Combined Dunavant and Clark market shares fall to 80%.  
Competition increases.  Charges that new entrants provide 
few if any inputs to farmers. Credit recovery falls to < 60% 
during 1997/98. 
1999  Lonrho, citing input credit losses of 
US$2m, leaves Zambia.  Assets purchased 
by private company Dunavant. 
Lonrho had begun to launch “Distributor System”, Dunavant 
(under same management) continues to develop it.  Credit 
recovery rises above 60%. 
1999-
2001 
Dunavant fully develops Distributor 
System. 
Credit recovery improves to 85%.  At least one recent 
entrant falters but does not leave market. 
2001/2  Drought in southern areas of country  Indications that credit recovery rate decreased 
2002  New government enters late 2001, 
launches “Food Security through Cotton” 
program mid-2002 
Program still taking shape.  Publically funded credit line for 
input provision, being developed in collaboration with 







                                                 
1 ICAC estimates that subsidies reach 50% of world prices in the USA, 20% in China, and over 100% in the EU. 
Elimination of U.S. subsidies would raise world prices by US$0.12/lb. 
2  Price share varied much more for each country than did export value per ha. 
3  Subsidies in Zimbabwe include a 30 year loan from the World Bank to the Cotton Marketing Board in 1992, and 
financial injections from government as late as 2001.  Farmers in WCA received subsidies US$50m-60m during the 
last cropping season (Badiane, et al., 2002) 
4  The Cotton Development Trust has to date focused on technical issues.  Mulungushi Textiles is a joint venture 
between the governments of Zambia and China (Mainland), but has a very small market share and has no 
coordinating or regulatory role. 